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Comments (48)
- eggbrainThere will always be a subset of users whose goal is to not use your service, but to arbitrage your service into the maximum value for themselves.For example -- let's say you offer $100 in free AWS credits by signing up to your platform. Expect a malicious user to eventually come to your platform, realize they can resell those $100 in credits for $50, and start using your platform for their own gain. Unless the mechanisms you add in place to reduce fraud / second sign ups / etc is greater than the value that they are receiving ($50), they will continue.With sites where the platform is free, the math almost always makes sense for these malicious users to eventually abuse. In this case it was leveraging the email reputation of another domain at no cost to their own (along with the added value of anyone getting phished), but on other sites it's public profiles being used for backlinks / spam, etc.
- no_multitudesPlease write your blog post yourself if you expect people to read it. The LLM output is very grating.
- j-bos"Disposable email domains blocked" This one is really annoying as in practice, more and more services that become spammers or sell to what are basically spammers cannot be kept at arms length.
- sandeepkdCouple thing:1. You are not alone, this happens at a large scale across the board with companies of all sizes.2. More than likely the abuser did not do it manually, more than likely they automated it3. As a thoughtful business one may have rolled out all the authentication features/gates if the business picks up, as a starter the safe idea could have been to put it behind any openly available OAuth provider
- comrade1234Spammers are relentless. I had something similar happen to me 25 years ago. And once you're found out to allow any sort of information relay you end up in spamming scripts and for decades automated scripts will be trying to send/relay through you using the same api, even if you block it.You learn to not leave anything open to spammers AT ALL, to your product's detriment because once you're labeled a spammer in this way your product is dead.
- fg137I guess the author learned a hard lesson about preventing abuse of a web service, especially a service that is capable of sending emails.I have a few small projects that I would love to serve publicly from my VPS. But I have put them behind strict logins (no signup) or put them in read-only mode, with (likely premature) rate limiting, fail2ban and cloudflare, for fear that a month of bandwidth gets used within minutes by an attacker. For the same reason, sometimes I only shared the source on github and let people deploy it themselves if they are interested.
- autoexecI don't know what domain was used to send that crap but you should probably have an abuse contact listed at kaneo.app so that if people do discover issues from your service they have an easy way to get a hold of you.
- dddddavidddddI've been thinking of making an event platform like Partiful, but only for personal use because it's also the perfect platform for spam (send emails and texts to people with attacker-controller content).
- ChrisMarshallNYThis kind of thing has happened to me.I designed something that was "too open," and that "openness" was abused.Sadly, spammers are why we can't have nice things; but that's been the case for decades. The incident I mentioned, happened in the 1990s.The good news is, is that once this happens to you, you learn your lesson.
- bradley13Sadly, the Internet is not a high trust society.
- fsckboy[dead]
- mplewisPlease write your own blog posts rather than asking us to read LLM slop.
- jubilantiIf you have commits in the linux kernel, your open source code has certainly been used to murder people. Because it's in everything, including weapons systems.
- cobertosIs this the new norm for trying to make software projects in the wild?The 14000 sends over 3 hours (< 1/s) makes it sound more-than-human speed. E.g. automated.Wondering if LLM-assisted vulnerability hunting will lead to the same gains in scale for bad actors wanting to find spammable channels in applications. The barrier to entry becomes so much greater because any small project, once found, can be wrung dry of all its trust signals by third parties
- reconnectingCaptcha here will only harm your real users' experience and won't protect against this kind of abuse, since it comes from real scammers, not fully automated bots.I've dealt with these and similar issues over the last 8 years, which led our team to develop a security tool 5 years ago that is now open-sourced.https://github.com/tirrenotechnologies/tirreno