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Comments (228)

  • giantg2
    Maybe my perception is off, but it seems like there's a huge push by the legislature and some people to do anything and everything to prevent CSAM, yet almost nothing seems to be done to prevent CSA.For CSAM, there's all sorts of monitoring, scanning, identify capturing, etc. But it's all after abuse has taken place, and it seems that many of the people actually arrested are arrested for CSAM and not CSA. This has even extended to fictional CSAM such as AI generated stories and pictures. As an aside, if that gets extended to political speech or other non-CSAM materials that are determined to be undesirable, that's a big concern. I can imagine that a conservative state could pass a law banning all porn because they claim it could encourage illegal activities such as prostitution, rape, or CSA.On the CSA side, you rarely hear about arrests (they happen but less than CSAM). There doesn't seem to be any real push for educating and protecting kids before it happens. Ironically, the groups doing the most to educate and implement protective strategies are the ones who have been involved in abuse scandals in the past (Churches, Scouts, etc). Even then, a lot of it is just getting clearances, which doesnt prevent people who where not caught or were first timers. Offenders get put on a list/map. This is sort of a half approach. If they are still a threat, they shouldn't be released. Yet if you comb the list and see some of the results, they don't all seem to fit with CSA. I personally know of 1 who took a leak across from a playground at 2am walking home from the bars and was put on the sex offender registry because it was within 500'.It seems like these laws are more about peddling to the publicist and lawmakers fantasy of incrementally extreme punishment rather than taking a appropriate, data driven, and level-headed approach that actually protects kids. Otherwise they will just keep pushing ham-fisted low-hanging "fixes" like required scanning and IDs to access the internet.
  • amazingamazing
    It is crazy people think apple isnt on the side of privacy. Are they perfect? Not even close, but compared to the rest of big tech theyre simply on another level.Apple could easily not do this stuff and it may even be easier to not.
  • majorchord
    IMO "end-to-end encryption" simply isn't possible when the application is run by the same company as the servers the data sits on, is closed source, and can at any time, see the decrypted contents of data it downloads from their servers and do whatever they want with it.Same issue with Proton, MEGA, and any other e2ee app... it's only useful when the company decides not to mess with the data it could always decrypt locally. Also why people are hesitant to use javascript-based e2ee solutions where the site owner can modify the code at will to do what they want.
  • djoldman
    I am not a lawyer.There is something ironic about US laws that attempt to prevent crime A by outlawing action B. For example: * A: physical sexual abuse of children. B: possession or distribution of CSAM * A: drug trafficking or tax evasion. B: structured cash withdrawals The irony is that the more B is prevented, the less A can be detected and the less B can be used as evidence of A.It's my understanding that conviction of CSAM-related crimes do not require any physical act to have ever occurred to any real person: one can be convicted of CSAM-related crimes related to paintings/drawings/created_art of fictional people.It's my understanding that one can be convicted of structured withdrawals that are not driven by, linked to, or in any way related to anything nefarious.
  • JSR_FDED
    The judge called the outcome disturbing, as it leaves victimized children as "collateral damage" of privacy protections.As sad as this is, end to end encryption means no CSAM scanning.As an alternative Apple previously tried to do scanning on the phones locally but caught hell for that too.This is one of those unfortunate tradeoffs but I see no alternative to privacy taking priority.
  • jobs_throwaway
    A win for privacy and freedom
  • ryanisnan
    As the creator of mediaden.ca[1] I’ve thought about this. Client side scanning is maybe marginally better than server side scanning, but both paths lead to privacy rot.Governments need to catch criminals, but they shouldn’t do it at everyone else’s expense.1. https://mediaden.ca
  • drnick1
    I simply don't trust services such as iCloud. The legal landscape is too volatile, and Apple's own "terms and conditions" are also subject to constant change. As far as I can tell, most people don't need cloud backups, and iCloud mostly shows up as an annoyance designed to extract more money from customers. In fact, most people probably don't know that Apple and Google vacuum up their files the moment they are created, for their own good, of course.
  • St0n3d
    “Apple created its own proprietary alternative, NeuralHash, which apparently wasn’t as good. So Apple U-turned on its efforts to scan for CSAM in its cloud storage. Instead, Apple implemented end-to-end encryption for iCloud files.”Wasn’t Apple’s design to explicitly NOT scan in its cloud storage, but look at the file on-device at the moment you wish to upload it to iCloud? This method would make it compatible with Advanced Data Protection; so ADP could have always been in the pipeline rather than Apple u-turning. In fact, NeuralHash may have been proposed because Apple wanted to introduce ADP and saw a potential problem here/get concerns from government agencies about it and saw this as a means to an end(-to-end).The system was designed pretty elegantly and offers far better privacy protections - including guardrails - than what Microsoft and Google do, but the communication from Apple about it was absolutely horrible and generated enormous backlash. (Not saying I agreed with implementing it, just saying the design was infinitely better than competitors.)
  • quaddoggy
    Ah, the CSAM saga. Very poorly handled by Apple. Suspect it may have taken Hair Force One off the shortlist of CEO succession.
  • wbl
    IANAL but I thought the whole reason scanning worked was it wasn't required so there weren't fourth amendment issues.
  • twuopf
    I know creating a throwaway to hide your name for an opinion is a bad manner, but this one is one I really don’t want linked back to meThe VAST majority of “CSAM” is consensually created and exchanged by teens. Their future selves and their parents form this pressure group attacking everyone’s liberty and privacy to try to undo the downsides of choices they made themselves with full knowledge of what could happen.The criminal and disgusting tail end of this type of material deserves the worst of consequences for the perpetrators and all the support in the world for the victims, but these are mostly - you guessed it - poor and unprivileged children from far away places and they certainly can’t put this much pressure on apple
  • m3kw9
    If these judges are so righteous, they should go further and mandate the OS to do mandatory scanning of personal hd.
  • kmeisthax
    sighOnce again, someone (in this case, the judge of this case) asks if we can meet in the middle on whether or not private communications are actually private.To be clear: this is not a limitation of nerds' imagination. This is a limitation of physics. A person is either party to a communication (and thus can decrypt it) or is not (and thus cannot). If you demand Apple scan encrypted photos for CSAM, what you are demanding is that Apple be party to every communication done with an iPhone. There is no middle ground on encryption, there will never be a middle ground on encryption, and I will hold this truth on my deathbed.There is no "encrypted but crackable" - if the CIA can crack it at all, we're only a few years away from some kid's gaming rig doing the same thing. There is no "secure golden key" - if there was, you could buy it in the same section of Amazon that sells copies of the TSA master key that opens all luggage locks.Personally, the next time a government demands decryption keys, I think Apple should just set all iCloud photo libraries in that country to public and say "Sorry, your politicians made private photos illegal, take it up with them". Obviously, telegraph this far in advance and give users time to actually delete their cloud-hosted photos first. But definitely do not pretend like you can keep a secret with a government bureaucracy of hundreds of thousands of people.But then again, Apple also capitulated (good meaning) to the EU on third-party app distribution, so Apple has a lot less of a spine than they let on. At least Google actually stayed out of China.
  • i3ima
    the judge is indeed wise
  • 1saadcodes
    [dead]
  • economistbob
    Seems like the kids miss their chance at justice because of section 230 allowing platforms the freedom to remove whatever they want but not be responsible for what they keep or amplify. That is the problem with 230. Censorship is permitted and punishing the censor isn't. Twitter and Tiktok are literally microblog platforms that get away with removing good stuff and leaving evil because they "are not a publisher" while the algorithm literally publishes a chosen set of articles to people. Facebook can remove religious freedom material and leave human trafficking groups. Section 230 gives the publishers the cake and the edict too.