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Comments (66)

• account42
  And how many more times do we need to read news like this before we replace Web PKI with a system that isn't as completely insane?We already have a functioning system for delegating domain ownership in a hierarchical fashion where compromises are limited to only the subtree under the compromised entity. Let's start using it for domain validation sooner rather than later.
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  agwa
  https://gist.github.com/AGWA/5a78186e0f4a7d537b8891a7b46f945... is the list of certificates in Certificate Transparency issued by the blocked CAs as of this time. They appear to be non-malicious test certificates, and the DNS name in the first certificate indicates who likely discovered the issue.What's alarming and unprecedented is that yesterday, two Certificate Transparency log implementations were updated to block the logging of certificates issued by the CAs. This likely indicates total private key compromise, and the blocking by CT logs is to prevent the logs from being spammed by forged certificates. However, it also means there will be no place to record forged certificates found in the wild. (These certificates won't validate in CT-enforcing clients since they won't be in CT logs, but could be used to attack non-CT-enforcing clients.)
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  agwa
  Other certificate verifiers are doing the same:Node: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/66871rustls/webpki: https://github.com/rustls/webpki/pull/546Electron: https://github.com/electron/electron/pull/55126This is very serious and you should definitely upgrade. Hopefully OpenSSL will have a patch soon as well.
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  ericbarrett
  A bit more info (and some discussion linked from these Bugzilla reports):https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083709https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2018979
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  wnoise
  It is a shame that you cannot have a cert signed by multiple CAs.(The format seems like it would allow it, but nothing supports it, and in practice CAs demand the ability to actually modify some fields, and then sign that.)
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  accountrequired
  "Sir, this is a Wendy's" moment where my compiler thought it was a root certificate authority
• arvidtheking
  these issuing CA got compromised: https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic...
• q3k
  $ curl https://q3k.google.com --resolve 'q3k.google.com:443:135.181.235.221'Yeah okay this is funny. Nice little CTF challenge :).
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  mschuster91
  Why the hell does Go ship its own root CA list? This is a task for the operating system, and at the very least Windows, macOS and most flavors of Linux ship an OS-wide truststore. It's annoying enough with Java to keep stuff updated...
• mendym
  This seems to be the list of certs https://gist.github.com/mendymm/ff7a9fd00339260b4d2dbdcb0f48...data from https://www.ccadb.org/resources
• direwolf20
  So even if your OS trusts these certs, programs written in Go won't. This is extremely unusual and makes me think someone got a National Security Letter.
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  jeffbee
  It's interesting that this sort of policy is baked into a language platform.
• alexcodebytes
  [dead]