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EMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise

EMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise

galadran

Comments (93)

  • eqvinox
    Since I haven't seen this mentioned enough yet:The private key for all 8 "compromised" CAs is a single byte: https://mastodon.catgirl.cloud/@49016/117474217042191790One of the private keys is literally "4".I'm putting "compromise" in quotes here, because I can't call it that without cringing and cursing.[cf. also: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50169109]
  • galadran
    The impact of this incident is very unevenly spread.Over 10 years ago, Mozilla shipped OneCRL [1]. We remediated this incident in a couple of hours for Firefox users who were protected automatically without the need for updates. Chrome, Apple and Microsoft have similar tooling. Since then, we've built more advanced tooling to handle revocation at scale for leaf certs (CRLite [2]).However, for the rest of the ecosystem, there has been little to no investment in revocation and for those clients, this is a massive problem. Hopefully, we'll see folks invest now. Efforts like upki [3] look promising.[1] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-interm...[2] https://hacks.mozilla.org/2025/08/crlite-fast-private-and-co...[3] https://github.com/rustls/upki
  • hypfer
    From what the internet is telling me, the keys were allegedly found on https://repository.emsign.com/certs/<redacted>.crtWhich, if true, is definitely a lot of fun.Hope you people are ready for lots and lots of suddenly hackable IoT.__Edit: I might also be misinterpreting what I am seeing and it's actually weak logic that created the keys, in the sense that one could guess the private key?Someone actually qualified please give credible answers. I'm just pretending.
  • dochtman
    Running Go? Upgrade to 1.27.3 or 1.26.10.Rust with rustls? Upgrade to rustls-webpki 0.103.16 and/or webpki-roots/webpki-root-certs 1.0.10.Python? Upgrade certifi to 2026.10.19.Homebrew ca-certificates? 2026-09-25_1.Electron? 44.9.1, 43.8.1, or 42.11.16.
  • ghuntley
    Just wrote up a quickie about how Nix + LLMs make patching everything super simple via overlays. Simplest security response I've ever done in my life. http://ghuntley.com/patch
  • anon
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  • CiPHPerCoder
    If you're responsible for PHP client software, and waiting on composer/ca-bundle to release a new update, be aware that https://github.com/paragonie/certainty has been updated with the 2026-10-20 bundle already.
  • q3k
    https://chaos.social/@fluepke/117474156947559280D=4. That's the entire private key for one of the certs.
  • aghuang
    This probably has an unimaginable blast radius of existing software out there.
  • TedDoesntTalk
    are there any consequences to eMudhra?
  • account42
    > What are the consequences?> An attacker with the private key of any of the compromised intermediate CAs could impersonate any website or service.And how many more times do we need to read this before we replace Web PKI with a system that isn't as completely insane?We already have a functioning system for delegating domain ownership in a hierarchical fashion where compromises are limited to only the subtree under the compromised entity. Let's start using it for domain validation sooner rather than later.
  • jeffrallen
    Thanks Wayne.
  • albert_e
    trying to understand where this service is mainly used. judging by a quick google search ...is this related to Government of India related websites and their services/websites like tax filing etc? is the impact expected to be concentrated around indian citizens availing these services?
  • quotemstr
    Web PKI is cursed. Why should anyone have to ship a new version of Go, Electron, webpki-roots, etc. (possibly over a now-compromised TLS connection!) just to revoke a certificate? Why are so many packages independently shipping high-sensitivity trust-bootstrap credentials? And why can any CA still vouch for any domain instead of each being limited to a specific ccTLD or other non-total shard of subject names?Also, it's quietly, in the email space, that we're seeing real innovation while browser vendors just say "no" to everything. We should be distributing trust, not centralizing it in browser vendor security teams and Let's Encrypt.
  • anon
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